

¹ The Court cannot ascertain from Plaintiff's handwriting whether this Defendant's name is Dougherty or Daughtery.

denied medical treatment, housed in a cell with mold and water leaking, and condemned to segregation merely because Defendant Weatherly dislikes him. (*Id.*) Hughlett alleges he has filed grievances to Defendant Weatherly's supervisor, Defendant Dougherty, but Defendant Dougherty has concurred with Defendant Weatherly's actions. (*Id.*) He seeks monetary damages and asks that the Defendants be fired or ordered to resign.

II. Analysis

The Court is required to screen prisoner complaints and to dismiss any complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint—

- (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
- (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint in this case states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court applies the standards under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). “Accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, the Court ‘consider[s] the factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.’” *Williams v. Curtin*, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 681) (alteration in original). “[P]leadings that . . . are no more than conclusions . . . are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679; *see also Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to

relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

“A complaint can be frivolous either factually or legally. Any complaint that is legally frivolous would *ipso facto* fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” *Hill*, 630 F.3d at 470 (citing *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 328-29 (1989)).

Whether a complaint is factually frivolous under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) is a separate issue from whether it fails to state a claim for relief. Statutes allowing a complaint to be dismissed as frivolous give “judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1915). Unlike a dismissal for failure to state a claim, where a judge must accept all factual allegations as true, *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50, a judge does not have to accept “fantastic or delusional” factual allegations as true in prisoner complaints that are reviewed for frivolousness. *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S. Ct. 1827.

Id. at 471.

“*Pro se* complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” *Williams*, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting *Martin v. Overton*, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). *Pro se* litigants and prisoners are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. *Wells v. Brown*, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); *see also Brown v. Matauszek*, No. 09-2259, 2011 WL 285251, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2011) (affirming dismissal of *pro se* complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”) (quoting *Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.*, 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)) (alteration in original); *Payne v. Sec’y of Treas.*, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming *sua sponte* dismissal of complaint pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for her”); *cf. Pliler v. Ford*, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (“District judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to *pro se* litigants.”); *Young Bok Song v. Gipson*, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of *pro se* litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).

Hughlett filed his complaint on the court-supplied form for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and laws” of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

The complaint contains no factual allegations against Defendant Chumley. When a complaint fails to allege any action by a defendant, it necessarily fails to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570.

Hughlett complains about being denied medical treatment and also about the conditions at the Jail, including exposure to mold and leaking water. For a convicted prisoner, such claims arise under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. *See generally Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). In the case of a pretrial detainee, “the ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ proscription of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution does not apply,” because “as a pre-trial detainee [the plaintiff is] not being ‘punished,’” *Cuoco v. Moritsugu*, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, a person detained prior to conviction receives protection against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if held in state custody. *Liscio v. Warren*, 901 F.2d 274, 275–76 (2d Cir.1990). *Caiozzo v. Koreman*, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009). Even if Hughlett was a pretrial detainee during the events at issue, the court will analyze his claims under Eighth Amendment principles because the rights of pretrial detainees are equivalent to those of convicted prisoners. *Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina*, 29 f.3d 238, 242 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing *Roberts v. City of Troy*, 773 F.2d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1985)).²

² On June 22, 2015, the Supreme Court held, in *Kingsley v. Hendrickson*, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2015), that excessive force claims brought by pre-trial detainees must be analyzed under a standard of objective reasonableness, rejecting a subjective standard that takes into account a defendant’s state of mind. *Id.* at 2472-73. It is unclear whether or to what extent the holding in *Kingsley* may affect the deliberate indifference standard for claims concerning an inmate’s health or safety, which the Sixth Circuit applies to both pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. *See Morabito v. Holmes*, --- F. App’x ---, 2015 WL 5920204, at *4-*5 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying, even after the decision in *Kingsley*, the objective reasonableness standard to pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims and the deliberate indifference standard to denial of medical care claim). Absent further guidance, the Court will continue to apply the deliberate indifference analysis to claims concerning a pretrial detainee’s health and safety.

An Eighth Amendment claim consists of both objective and subjective components. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); *Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); *Williams v. Curtin*, 631 F.3d at 383; *Mingus v. Butler*, 591 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2010). The objective component requires that the deprivation be “sufficiently serious.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834; *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 8; *Wilson*, 501 U.S. at 298.

Under *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” However, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 105. “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” *Id.*, at 106.

Within the context of *Estelle* claims, the objective component requires that the medical need be sufficiently serious. *Hunt v. Reynolds*, 974 F.2d 734, 735 (6th Cir. 1992). “A medical need is serious if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” *Ramos v. Lamm*, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting *Laaman v. Helgemoe*, 437 F. Supp. 269, 311 (D.N.H. 1977)).

To make out a claim of an Eighth Amendment *Estelle* violation, a prisoner must plead facts showing that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to undue

suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” *Westlake v. Lucas*, 537 F.2d 857, 860 (6th Cir. 1976). The Court clarified the meaning of deliberate indifference in *Farmer v. Brennan*, as the reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm; mere negligence will not suffice. *Id.* 511 U.S. at 835-36.

Hughlett does not allege what his serious medical needs are, that he ever requested medical treatment from any named Defendant, or that any named Defendant denied his request for medical treatment. He states only that he was refused medical attention. Such a conclusory allegation is insufficient to establish either the objective or subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation.

With regard to Hughlett’s claims regarding mold and leaking water, in order to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834; *see also Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.*, 408 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2005), or that he has been deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” *Wilson*, 501 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also Hadix v. Johnson*, 367 F.3d 513, 525 (6th Cir. 2004) (“To succeed in an Eighth Amendment challenge, [a prisoner] must establish that . . . a single, identifiable necessity of civilized human existence is being denied”). The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons.” *Wilson*, 501 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[R]outine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 9 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” *Id.* at 9.

In considering the types of conditions that constitute a substantial risk of serious harm, the Court evaluates not only the seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that the

harm will actually occur, but evidence that unwilling exposure to that risk violates contemporary standards of decency, *i.e.*, that society does not choose to tolerate the risk in its prisons. *Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). The Supreme Court has also emphasized that prisoners can rarely establish an Eighth Amendment violation from a combination of conditions of confinement that, in themselves, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation:

Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation “in combination” when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets. To say that some prison conditions may interact in this fashion is a far cry from saying that all prison conditions are a seamless web for Eighth Amendment purposes. Nothing as amorphous as “overall conditions” can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human need exists.

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304-05 (citation omitted); *see also Thompson*, 29 F.3d at 242 (“Eighth Amendment claims may not be based on the totality of the circumstances, but rather must identify a specific condition that violates” a particular right); *Carver v. Knox Cnty., Tenn.*, 887 F.2d 1287, 1294 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).

To establish the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that the official acted with the requisite intent, that is, that he had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834; *see also Wilson*, 501 U.S. at 297, 302-03. The plaintiff must show that the prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk that the prisoner would suffer serious harm. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834; *Wilson*, 501 U.S. at 303; *Helling*, 509 U.S. at 32; *Woods v. Lecureux*, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); *Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.*, 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835. Thus,

[a] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. This approach comports best with the text of the Eighth Amendment as our cases have interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual “conditions”; it outlaws cruel and unusual “punishments.” An act or omission unaccompanied by knowledge of a significant risk of harm might well be something society wishes to discourage, and if harm does result society might well wish to assure compensation. The common law reflects such concerns when it imposes tort liability on a purely objective basis. . . . But an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.

Id. at 837-38, 114 S. Ct. at 1979 (emphasis added; citations omitted); *see also Garretson v. City of Madison Heights*, 407 F.3d 789, 796 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If the officers failed to act in the face of an obvious risk of which they should have known but did not, then they did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The subjective component must be evaluated for each defendant individually. *Bishop v. Hackel*, 636 F.3d 757, 767 (6th Cir. 2011); *see also id.* at 768 (“[W]e must focus on whether each individual Deputy had the personal involvement necessary to permit a finding of subjective knowledge.”).

Hughlett does not allege that any named Defendant was personally responsible for exposing him to mold or leaking water. Furthermore, Hughlett fails to allege that he suffered any harm as a result of such exposure. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”

The allegations in Hughlett’s complaint concerning his placement in segregation are too vague to state a due process claim and do not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Hughlett does not state whether he was charged with or convicted of any disciplinary violation, what

specific role any named Defendant may have played in his placement in segregation, or how long he has been in segregation. Hughlett also does not complain about any procedures employed during a disciplinary hearing. In general, an inmate does not have a liberty interest in a particular security classification or in freedom from administrative segregation. *Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); *Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); *Montanye v. Haymes*, 427 U.S. 236, 243 (1976); *Moody v. Daggett*, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); *Newell v. Brown*, 981 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1992); *Beard v. Livesay*, 798 F.2d 874, 876 (6th Cir. 1986). The complaint does not allege that the conditions experienced by Hughlett in segregation imposed an atypical and significant hardship sufficient to violate due process. *See Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 486 (1995).

Although Hughlett alleges that he has been discriminated against, he does not have a valid equal protection claim against any Defendant. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. Most Equal Protection claims “allege that a state actor intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class.” *Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist.*, 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The complaint does not allege that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class.³ That Plaintiff may have been treated differently than other prisoners is insufficient to state a claim because prisoners are not a protected class for equal protection purposes. *See, e.g., Harbin-Bey v. Rutter*, 420 F.3d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2005); *Berry v. Traughber*, 48 F. App’x 483, 485 (6th Cir. 2002); *Garrison v. Walters*, No. 00-1662, 2001 WL 1006271, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 24, 2001); *Heddleston v. Mack*, No. 00-1310, 2000 WL 1800576,

³Alternatively, a plaintiff may allege that the challenged action unduly burdens the exercise of a fundamental right. This case does not involve the exercise of a fundamental right.

at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (“prisoners incarcerated at the same institution as Heddleston who wished to mail items weighing more than one pound on January 9, 1999, do not constitute a protected class”); *Aldred v. Marshcke*, No. 98-2169, 1999 WL 1336105, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 1999); *Shehee v. Luttrell*, 199 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 1999); *Preston v. Hughes*, No. 97-6507, 1999 WL 107970, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 10, 1999); *Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998) (“neither indigents nor prisoners are a suspect class”); *Hampton v. Hobbs*, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997).

This also is not an appropriate case for a “class of one” Equal Protection claim.

The purpose of [the Equal Protection Clause] is to secure every person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents. . . . Equal protection challenges are “typically . . . concerned with governmental classifications that affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” *Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric.*, 553 U.S. 591, 601, 128 S. Ct. 2146, 170 L. Ed. 2d 975 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that a “class-of-one” may bring an equal protection claim where the plaintiff alleges that: (1) he or “she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated”; and (2) “there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” *Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech*, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S. Ct. 1073, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1060 (2000).

United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 657, 650-51 (6th Cir. 2011) (additional internal quotation marks and citation omitted), *cert. denied*, 132 S. Ct. 1056 (2012); *see also Davis v. Prison Health Servs.*, 679 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing “class of one” claims from other equal protection claims evaluated under the rational basis standard).

The complaint does not allege that Hughlett was arbitrarily treated differently than similarly situated prisoners at the jail or that he has a valid claim for a “class of one.”

Hughlett appears to claim that Defendant Dougherty failed to properly redress his grievance against Defendant Weatherly. However, Defendant Dougherty’s participation in investigating, processing, or denying Hughlett’s grievances cannot in itself constitute sufficient

personal involvement to state a claim of constitutional dimension. *Simpson v. Overton*, 79 F. App'x 117, 120 (6th Cir. 2003); *see also Martin v. Harvey*, 14 F. App'x 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The denial of the grievance is not the same as the denial of a request to receive medical care.”). Section 1983 liability may not be imposed against a defendant for “a mere failure to act” based upon information contained in the grievance. *See Shehee*, 199 F.3d at 300; *Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ.*, 76 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir. 1996).

For all of the foregoing reasons, Hughlett’s complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

III. Leave to Amend

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint to avoid a *sua sponte* dismissal under the PLRA. *LaFountain v. Harry*, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); *see also Brown v. R.I.*, No. 12-1403, 2013 WL 646489, at *1 (1st Cir. Feb. 22, 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded.”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be cured. *Brown*, 2013 WL 646489, at *1; *Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States*, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean, of course, that every *sua sponte* dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that the plaintiff cannot prevail and that amending the complaint would be futile, then a *sua sponte* dismissal may stand.”); *Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (“*in forma pauperis* plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile”); *Curley v. Perry*, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that *sua sponte* dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by

amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts.”). In this case, the Court cannot conclude that any amendment to Hughlett’s claims would be futile as a matter of law.

IV. Conclusion

The Court DISMISSES Hughlett’s complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). However, leave to amend is GRANTED. Any amended complaint must be filed within thirty (30) days after the date of this order. Hughlett is advised that an amended complaint will supersede the original pleadings and must be complete in itself without reference to those prior pleadings. The text of the complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the original complaint. Hughlett may add additional defendants provided that the claims against the new parties arise from the acts and omissions set forth in the original complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count and must identify each defendant sued in that count. If Hughlett fails to file an amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will assess a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and enter judgment.

Hughlett is reminded that he must promptly notify the Clerk of any change of address or extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order of the Court, may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ James D. Todd
JAMES D. TODD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE